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THE ESQUIRE CASE - A NOVEL EXTENSION OF THE
POSTMASTER-GENERAL'S POWERS OF CLASSIFYING MAIL
I.
ExcEPT for regulation of the size and weight of mailable matter and abor-
tive attempts to curb the distribution of Abolitionist literature- Congress
made scant attempt to impose restrictions on the use of the mails until after
the Civil War. Concomitant with the growth of the Post Office Department,
1. Under 3 STAT. 264 (1816), 39 U. S. C. §240 (1940), local postmasters were em-
powered to exclude bulky matter, if too difficult to handle or transmit.
2. An exhaustive debate on the limitations which the First Amendment imposed on
regulation of the mail took place in the Senate in 1836, in consequence of President Jack-
son's message of December 2, 1835, urging enactment of legislation to curb the flood of
abolitionist literature being sent into the South. 48 Nr.as REoIs'as 402 (1835) ; 2 STATES-
IAN'S MANUAL 1018 (1858); ROGERS, THE PosT,% POWER OF CNoRESs (1916) 102-116.
Led by Calhoun, an ardent advocate of states' rights and defender of slavery, the Senate
declined to enact any general legislation, on the ground that Congress had no power to
exclude objectionable matter from the mails. 12 DEn.fTEs or CoNcnss 3R,3 (1836) ; 5
CALuour's Wopms 191 (1855). This was tantamount to an assertion that there the
federal government had no police power control over the use of the mails. As a sub-
stitute, Calhoun sponsored a bill making it a crime for postmasters to deliver publications,
th circulation of which %as forbidden by local laws. 12 DmflATES or CoNGnEsS 1721
(1836). The bill was defeated largely because of the argument that it was undesirable to
have federal agents governed in the performance of their duties by state legislation. But
see Sec. 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 73 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 322 (1940) ; 2
STAT. 295 (1804) ; Ex Porte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1879).
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however, a series of statutes were enacted in the 1860's and 1870's, vesting
discretion to exclude certain types of matter in the Postmaster General.3
Broadly speaking, this legislation fell into two categories: the first concerned
with protecting the physical safety of employees or other mail ;4 the second
designed to permit exclusion of matter which was privy to fraudulent schemes
or lotteries or which was considered morally reprehensibleY
When promoters of lotteries or shady schemes challenged these exclusion
statutes as violative of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court gave them short shrift. In Ex Parte Jackson,0 the
first important case, decided in 1876, the Court, instead of frankly predicat-
ing authority for the enactment of such legislation on a variant of the police
power doctrine, chose the unnecessarily latitudinarian course of calling the
use of the mails a privilege, which Congress could grant or withhold under
any conditions it pleased.7 - The Constitutional argument was by-passed with
the assertion that free access to the mails was unnecessary, since other means
of circulation were available.8
Succeeding cases 9 continued to expound the privilege doctrine, often, how-
ever, without reiteration of the free circulation caveat of the Jackson case.
The "other media" argument was palpably more an excuse than a reality,
3. See" RoGmas, op. cit. supra note 2, at 47-8.
4. Under 17 STAT. 283,300-301 (1872), 18 U. S. C. § 340 (1940), local postmasters were
empowered to exclude matter of an explosive, inflammable, or poisonous nature.
5. The earliest of these laws was 13 STAT. 507 (1865), 18 U. S. C. § 512 (1940),
barring obscene material from the mails. Later legislation banned defamatory material
or letters or circulars used in connection with schemes to defraud. 15 STAT. 196 (1868),
as amended by 17 STAT. 323 (1872), 18 U. S. C. §338 (1940); 25 STAT. 496 (1888) 18
U. S. C. § 335 (1940). Liquor advertising was excluded from the mails by 39 STAr. 1069
(1917)-; repealed later by 48 STAT. 316 (1934). Prize fight films were excluded by 37
STAT. 240 (1912), 18 U. S. C. §§405-407 (1934); repealed by 54 STAT. 686 (1940). Ad-
vertisements of, or information concerning, lotteries legalized by state charter were ex-
cluded by 19 STAT. 90 (1876), as amended by 26 STAT 465 (1890), 18 U. S. C. § 336 (1940).
6. 96 U. S. 727 (1877).
7. "The power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal
system of the country" and necessarily embraces "the right to determine what should be
excluded," Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 732 (1877).
8. 96 U. S. 727, 732 (1877).
9. ". . . it is also true that the mail facilities are not required to be furnished for
every purpose", In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 134 (1892) (upholding denial of the mails to
matter used in connection with a lottery scheme); "The legislative body in thus estab-
lishing a postal service may annex such conditions to it as it chooses", Public Clearing
House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 506 (1904) (upholding refusal to deliver mail used as part
of a fraudulent scheme). See also Electric Bond and Share Co. v. S. E. C., 303 U. S. 419
(1938); American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1902);
Homer v. United States, 143 U. S. 207 (1892) ;. The Rapier decision was attacked as a
violation of the First Amendment, in 155 No. AMER. REv. 694 (1892).
A more logical argument to justify exclusion was presented in the government's brief in
Public Clearing House v. Coyne, supra, vhtre it was asserted that Congressional power
over the mails, since granted in the same paragraph of the Constitution as the power to coin
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since prior to the organization of truck distributors, the Post Office Department
had a factual monopoly over the circulation of periodicals. Moreover, the use
of such "other media" was subjected to control after 1903, when the Court
read a federal police power into the commerce clause in upholding an act
under which Congress barred the interstate distribution of lottery circulars."'
Meanwhile, in 1879, Congress had enacted a general classification statute,
dividing mailable matter into four groups for rate purposes." To encourage
the circulation of periodicals of general or learned interest, such newspapers
or magazines were accorded special low rates, if certain mechanical conditions
were observed and provided they were "published for the dissemination of
information of a public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts,
or some special industry." 12
money, was as broad as the powers exercised pursuant to statutory mandate, by the comp-
troller of the currency. See Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673 (1876); Kennedy v. Gibson,
8 Wall 498 (U. S. 1869).
10. Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903). See also Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325
(1915) ; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 321 U. S. 760 (1944) ; Hoke and Econo-
mides v. United States, 227 U. S. 30S (1913) ; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S.
45 (1911) (constitutionality of Pure Food and Drug Act). Interstate transportation of
obscene literature is banned under 18 U. S. C. § 396 (1940), making both receiver and
sender liable.
In recent years the mail fraud statute, 17 ST.T. 323 (1872), 18 U. S. C. § 333 (1940),
has been broadly construed so as to permit punishment of vendors of watered stock or
perpetrators of other larcenous schemes, even though the facilities of the post office were
used unpremeditedly and then only in connection with incidental and not directly fraudu-
lent portions of the transactions. United States v. Bogy, 16 F. Supp. 407 (D. Tenn., 1936),
affirmed 96 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), cert. denied 305 U. S. 603 (1038) ; Stephens
v. United States, 41 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930), cert. denied 282 U. S. 80 (1930).
The most extreme use of the statute came in indictments brought by former Assistant
Attorney General Rogge against leaders of the Huey Long machine. Despite sedulous
efforts by the state politicians to avoid use of the mails, federal jurisdiction was hinged
on the fact that various depositaries mailed the checks in the regular course of business
until they reached the drawee banks. Hart v. United States, 112 F. (2d) 123 (C. C. A. Sth,
1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 684 (1940), rehearing denied 311 U. S. 726 (1941) United
States v. Leche, 34 F. Supp. 982 (D. La. 1940), affirmed, 118 F. (2d) 246 (C. C. A. 8th,
1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 617 (1941), rehearing denied, 314 U. S. 712 (1941).
11. 20 STAT. 359 (1879), 39 U. S. C. §226 (1940).
12. The complete provision of the statute reads as follows: "Except as otherwise
provided by law, the conditions upon which a publication shall be admitted to the second
class are as follows: First. It must regularly be issued at stated intervals, as frequently
as four times a year, and bear a date of issue, and be numbered consecutively. Second.
It must be issued from a known office of publication. Third. It must be formed of printed
paper sheets, without board, cloth, leather, or other substantial binding, such as distinguish
printed books for preservation from periodical publications. Fourth. Prozided, That pub-
lications produced by the stencil, mimeograph, or hectograph process, or in imitation of
typewriting shall not be regarded as printing within the meaning of this clause. It must
be originated and published for the dissemination of information of a public character,
or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts, or some special industry, and having a legitimate
list of subscribers. Nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to admit to the
second class rate regular publications designed primarily for advertising purposes, or for
free circulation, or for circulation at nominal rates."
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During and after the first world war, Postmaster General Burleson suc-
cessfully used both the Classification Act and the exclusionary provisions
of the Espionage Act of 1917 18 to restrict the mailing of publications con-
taining allegedly seditious matter. Insofar as the exclusion related to the
particular numbers, containing anti-war or similar propaganda, there was no
question as to the statutory authority for exclusion. However, in dealing with
the Milwaukee Leader 14 and the Masses ",-both published under Socialist
auspices-the privilege doctrine was invoked to sanction restrictions which
were tantamount to previous restraints on circulation.
The Postmaster General had declared that some issues of both publications
regularly contained printed articles tending to interfere with the prosecution
of the War; thereupon he ordered permanent suspension of their second-
class mailing privileges. Over the vigorous dissents of Justices Brandeis and
Holmes and despite the refusal of Congress, in enacting the Espionage Act,
to bar from the mails future issues of periodicals which had printed seditious
articles,10 the Supreme Court upheld the Postmaster's suspension order, in
the Milwaukee Leader case.17 After reciting that the government had a
"practically plenary power over the use of the mails,"18 the majority invoked
13. 40 STAT. 230 (1917), 18 U. S. C. § 344 (1940). In 1908, Attorney General Bona-
parte had advised President Theodore Roosevelt that the post office had no inherent,
extra-statutory power to exclude anarchistic literature, but that a statute to this effect
would.be unquestionably constitutional. See SEN. Doc. No. 426, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908).
14. United States ex rel Milwaukee Soc. Dem. Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407
(1921) (referred to hereinafter as the Milwaukee Leader case).
15. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1917). See also the Social-
ist Call case, Burleson v. U. S. ex rel Workingmen's Co-op Pub. Ass'n, 274 Fed. 749 (App.
D. C. 1921), dismissed per stipulation, 260 U. S. 757 (1923) ; Jeffersonian Pub. Co. v.
West, 245 Fed. 585 (S. D. Ga. 1917).
16. In reporting to the House on the Espionage Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 217, 50 U. S. C.
§ 31 (1940), which had originally excluded from the mails all future issues of periodicals
which had contained treasonable or anarchistic matter, Representative Volstead (the Floor
Manager) pointed out: "... The only power we left in the bill over the snails gives the
postmaster the right to exclude treasonable or anarchistic matter-exclude that particular
edition, the partocular article." 55 CoNG. REC. 1607 (1917). It should be noted that this
point was apparently' overlooked in the Milwaukee Leader case, 255 U. S. 407 (1921).
17. The majority opinion has been vigorously criticized as motivated by wartime
hysteria. See CHAF E, FREE SPEEcH IN THE UNIru STATES (1941) 302-5; Deutsch,
Freedom of the Press and of the Mails (1938) 36 MicH. L. Rm. 703, at 743-6 (1938) ; Wet-
tach, Restrictions on a Free Press (1926) 4 N. C. L. REv. 24; Cohn, The Censorship of
Radical Materials by the Postoffice 17 ST. Louis L. Rxv. 95, 105-10; Comments (1921) 21
Co. L. REv. 715; (1931) 31 id. at 1148,1152; (1921) 16 ILL. L. REv. 134; (1921) 19 McH. L.
Rav. 728.
18. 255 U. S. 407, 411 (1921). The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice
Clarke. For later recrudescences of the "plenary power" doctrine, see Leach v. Carlile, 258
U. S. 138 (1922) ; Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F. (2d) 227 (S. D. N. Y. 1930), aff'd, 49 F. (2d)
1077 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 648 (1931) ; American Civil Liberties
Union v. Kiely, 40 F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930).
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the realistic presumption that the excluded newspaper would continue to pub-
lish illegal matter.' 9 Previous restraint was further justified by a bootstrap
argument: an issue violating the Espionage Act was non-mailable; since
therefore the periodical had missed an issue, it was not "regularly published"




'While the Post Office Department has acted with great circumspection dur-
ing the present war in withdrawing the second-class rights or excluding par-
ticular issues of periodicals because of their allegedly seditious contents,2-
it has recently taken the first move in a campaign admittedly designed to
19. 255 U. S. 407, 416 (1921).
20. 255 U. S. 407,411 (1921).
21. A show cause notice was issued and served on April 14, 1942, on . Perrin
Schwartz, the publisher and editor of Social Justice, initiating a proceeding for with-
drawal of that magazine's second-class privileges. Prior to the date set for the hearing,
the publisher and editor of Social Justice decided to suspend publication and voluntarily
abandoned their postal entry. Rev. Charles E. Coughlin concurred in this decision by
telegram sent to the Postmaster General. Post OFFIcE DEPAT, n ET Ornar NO. 17,553
(May 4, 1942).
On March 3, 1943, Postmaster General Walker revoked the second-class privileges of
The Militant, a weekly published under Trotzkyite auspices, for violation of the Espionage
Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 230 (1917), 18 U. S. C. § 343-4 (1940). The decision presumably
was bottomed on the majority opinion in the Milwaukee Leader case. No court
appeal was attempted. POST OFFICE DEPiA5TE5T O"an No. 20-10 (1943). Hearings
had been held before the Hearing Board of the Post Office Department in January and
February, 1943; the Department of Justice participated in these hearings arguing that The
Militant, subsequent to December 7, 1941, had "openly discouraged participation in the
war by the masses of the people. It is permeated with the thesis that the war is being
fought solely for the benefit of the ruling groups and will serve merely to continue the
enslavement of the working classes." POST OFFIcE DEPnrmEr T RELEAsE, March 8, 1943.
Late in 1944, the application of the publishers of The Militant for reinstatement of their
second class entry was granted. POST OFFcE DP.tmEPANTsi Orman, March 7, 1944. In addi-
tion, the second class entries of three allegedly pro-Fascist magazines have been revo!:ed
duringthe war. The entry of the Boise Valley IHerald, a pacifist weekly, was rcvokcd in Octo-
ber, 1942, and restored in February, 1944. An.tmxm. CIVIL Lm. Uuo:i, NVAn-T=n
PROSECUTIONS FOR SPEECH AND PUBLICATION (1944), 10-11.
During 1942, 1943, and 1944, the Post Office Department, acling under the Espionage
Act of 1917 and upon advice of the Department of Justice, banned from the mail several
numbers of the Fighfing Worker and the International .Nre.s, organs of the Revolutionary
Workers' League, a small Mid-Western anti-war offshoot of the Communist Party.
Neither paper enjoys second-class privileges. CIVIL Lmr..nMS QumA. (Sept., 1944) 1;
Communication by Vincent M. Miles, Solicitor, Post Office Dep't to Yale Law Journal,
dated Oct. 23, 1944. A number of individual issues of left-wing, semi-fascistic, and monetary
reform periodicals have been excluded from the mails during the war, as well as one Jan.,
1942, number of the Townsend National Weekly. See A. uIcAN CxvL Lmmsrxts Uz.-IoI;,
W A-Tinm PRosEcumoNs FoR FREE SPEECh AND Puneucxron, supra, at 11.
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hamper the circulation of "quasi-obscene" periodicals. The recent case of
Esquire v. Frank Walker 2 2-- the first move in this campaign-poses the
previous restraint and privilege doctrine questions in a novel setting, one
pregnant with the threat of veiled administrative censorship.
After extended departmental hearings,23 originally predicated on citations
alleging that the magazine published obscene material,2 4 the Postmaster Gen-
eral issued an order, withdrawing Esquire's second-class entry. The order
was predicated on the "factual" finding that the magazine made no "special
22. Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 55 Fed. Supp. 1015 (D. D. C. 1944), a bill to enjoin
enforcement of Post Office Department Order No. 23,459 (Dec. 30, 1943). Review might
have been sought by petition for mandamus. Payne v. Nat'l Ry. Pub. Co., 20 App. D. C.
581 (1902).
23. On October 14, 1943, pursuant to 31 STAT. 1106 (1901), 39 U. S. C. § 232 (1940),
Postmaster General Walker appointed a Hearing Board consisting of Fourth Assistant
Postmaster General Myers, Chief Clerk and Director of Personnel Ellis, and Deputy First
Assistant Postmaster General Cargill, to take testimony, hear argument, and report its
findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendation with respect to the charges set
forth in the citation. The charge that Esquire, even if not "obscene," did not meet the
fourth condition of the second-class mailing statute was not inserted in the citations until
October 25, 1943, at the beginning of the second week of the hearings. This change of
position was permitted over the objection of Esquire's counsel. TRANSCRIPT OF PRoci.u'
INGs BEFQRE POST OFFICE DFPARTAIENT HEARING BOARD ON ORDER No. 23,459, pp. 1806-17.
(Cited hereinafter as TRANSCRIPT.) On November 11, 1943, the Hearing Board, with
Cargill dissenting, recommended that the proceedings be dismissed. RECORD ON APPEAL,
5514-6. Cargill's dissent was predicated on the narrow finding that one item included in
one issue was obscene, that therefore the whole issue was non-mailable, and that the
consequent failure to publish regularly was a breach of the statutory conditions necessitating
sacrifice of the second-class privilege. Id. at 5552-5565. The analogy to Judge Clarke's
argument in the Milwaukee Leader case, 255 U. S. 407 (1921) is clear.
On December 30, 1943, Postmaster General Walker entered an order overruling the
findings of the Hearing Board and revoking Esquire's second-class entry. There is no
doubt that as the ultimate power of decision was in the Postmaster General, REv. STAT,
§ 3224 (1877), he was free to overrule the findings and disregard the recommenda-
tions of the Hearing Board, whose function was analogous to that of a Master or
Referee. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936). In lieu of an appli-
cation for a preliminary restraining injunction, the parties entered into a stipulation,
approved by the District Court, providing that Esquire was to continue to be mailed at
second-class rates pending final determination of the action, on condition that if the
Department's order was sustained, the publisher would pay the difference between
second- and fourth-class rates on all copies mailed from the effective date of the order.
Esquire's brief in District Court, p. 1, n. 1.
24. 86 out of a total of 1972 pages of text and art work included in eleven issues of
Esquire published in 1943 were originally cited as obscene. Nine witnesses--including a
Methodist Bishop, the Assistant Superintendent of Schools of the District of Columbia,
a psychiatrist at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington (a federal psychiatric institu-
tion), and the widow of the first administrator of the Pure Food and Drug Act-testified for
the Post Office Department as to the alleged obscenity or adverse effect on readers of the
cited material. None of these witnesses had ever read an entire issue of the magazine.
Several stated on cross-examination that cartoons taken by Esquire's counsel from Col-
lier's, the Arew Yorker, and the Readers' Digest were as obscene as the cited material
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contribution to the general welfare,"25 a novel interpretation uf the condi-
tion that second-class rates were to be accorded to publications intended "for
the dissemination of information of a public character".
The publishers sought to raise the grave constitutional and statutory con-
struction questions involved by a bill for an injunction, filed in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court Judge refused to
enjoin the order, primarily on the grounds that the Postmaster's classification
orders, by analogy to draft board classifications, were not subject to judicial
scrutiny,26 and that no issue of. censorship was at stake.2 In further corn-
from Esquire. One had never heard of Theodore Dreiser, John Steinbeck, Ernest Heming-
way, Mwaim Gorky, or M1aurice Mlaeterlinek. (Transcript, 4645-5263.)
Thirty-eight witnesses testified for Esquire in rebuttal-including the Secretary of
the Watch and Ward Societey of New England; Dr. Ernest Osborne of Teachers' Col-
lege, Columbia University, New York, advisory editor of Parents' Nagacine; H. L.
Mfencken; George Jean Nathan; Raymond Gram Suing; and the psychiatrists of Yale and
Harvard Universities. See Esquire's brief in the District Court, pp. 81-43. The Hearing
Board concluded that "The proof was overwhelming that Equire did not offend or violate
the standards of the mores of our days." TrA:¢scnrtrr, 5514.
Since there w%-as no declaration in the Postmaster's order and opinion in the nature
of a formal finding of fact or otherwise, that Esquire had printed obscene material, that
issue may not be raised on the appeal. See S. E. C. v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U. S. 80
(1943).
25. PosT OFFicE DEPARTMENT ORDER No. 23,459 (1943) p. 10.
26. On this point Judge Davidson, sitting in the District Court, said in part: "Ap-
peals to the court do not lie from orders of the President or his executive officers. A court
will not review or overturn an act of an ezecutive officer charged with the performing
of a given duty unless the act is arbitrary, capricious or unlawful. Is the order of the
Postmaster General unlawful, capricious or arbitrary? There is a very striking analogy
between his attitude in making this classification and the act of the draft board in classify-
ing a soldier for military duty. The draft board passes upon any claim of e'emption that
may be made by the draftee. The soldier may appeal to a board of appeals constituted
for that purpose. If he is dissatisfied with that ruling, he may not appeal to the court.
The court will review the classification, however, only when the draft board has acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in disregard of law, and this is brought to the court's attention
not in the way of appeal, but ordinarily by a writ of habeas corpus." 55 F. Supp. 1015, 1021
(D. D. C. 1944).
In Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53 (1912) it was held that when the show cause
citation initiating a hearing for revocation of a second-class entry recited that the pub-
lisher was distributing a series of books monthly, in the gui~e of a magazine, no reasons
for revocation need be given in, or in connection with, the order.
27. Judge Davidson's remarks were in part as follows: "If the Postmaster General
deals with an individual case without classifying it as a group, his act becomes capricious
and arbitrary and is subject to a review by the courts. Moreover, he is no doubt subject
to the will of the President. Finally, if his course becomes too general, Congress can re-
write the Act that he has failed to interpret in keeping with prevailing standards and con-
ceptions if he has so misinterpreted it. ThLre is a very decided difference between group-
ing and classifying and that of censoring. Censoring deals more with the specific article,
the deleting of objectionable portions. Classifying means grouping." 55 Fed. Supp. 1015,
1021 (D. D. C. 1944).
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menting on the contents of Esquire-a supererogatory task in light of the
Court's major premises-it was found that the magazine probably engen-
dered juvenile delinquency 28 and in any case did not contain the high grade
of literature printed in McGuffey's Readers, the standard of comparison
presumably contemplated by Congress in 1879.20 The case is now on appeal.
The issues thus joined transcend in importance the question of whether
Esquire will continue to be circulated under conditions permitting effective
market competition with other periodicals. For the Postmaster General has
publicly intimated that, if his interpretation of the Classification statute is
sustained, he will seek to withdraw the cheap mailing rights of other popular
magazines, which "cannot by any stretch of the imagination be construed as
published to elevate the mind, or improve public thought, or, disseminate infor-
mation of a public character." 30
28. "An appalling thing daily witnessed in our courts is the long string of juvenile de-
linquents: One has stolen an automobile, another is a sex pervert, while another is a
bank robber, or at least a pilferer in some one's mail. It is more appalling to find that
these young men in the main are devoid of any sense of shame. In their minds, they have
no code of morals that they have been ashamed to break. They know no standard. It must
be that they have not been taught.. Indeed, a man's conscience is dependent upon his
conception of that which is just and right. A cannibal of the South Seas has no con-
scientious scruples about catching, beheading and barbecuing, as it were, the child of his
neighbor. There may be many contributing causes to the delinquency of youth, but may
not the Postmaster General have reasonably had in mind that of literature as one?" Id. at
1019.
29. "These men of '79 who sat in the halls of Congress were boys in the fifty's. They
may have listened to William McGuffey filling the chair of noral philosophy in the Uni-
versity of Virginia. This, he did for more than a quarter of a century. If their train-
ing only extended to the common school, they found there the series of readers by William
McGuffey-First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Readers. The first was but a
primer for a boy of tender years, but the fifth and sixth embraced the most beautiful
classics. For a period of sixty years or more, the American )outli, or we may safely say
millions of them, learned at the feet of William McGuffey ... It was men of this type,
brought up under the ethics and standards of this period, who wrote in 1879, Section 226,
Title 39 of the U. S. C. A. giving a low rate to newspapers and like publications. May the
Postmaster General, therefore, have not been warranted in reaching his conclusions
that the literature referred to was literature of desirable type of an educational value?"
Id. at 1018-19. It would seem that in taking judicial notice of the literary habits of Congress-
men in 1879, Judge Davidson should have inquired into the adult tastes as well as the pre-
scribed childhood texts.
30. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDE
JUNE 30, 1943 (1943) 8; compare FRANKFURTER, Mi. JUSTicE BRANDEIS (1932) 111; "Tho
press is the most important vehicle for the dissemination of opinion. The Constitution
precludes its censorship. Equally inadmissible should be all oblique methods of censoring
the press. Particularly offensive is the coercive power of unregulated administrative col-
trol."
Curiously enough, a recent proceeding to deprive the Police Gazelle of its second-
class entry, predicated on an obscenity charge, was dismissed. The entry was revoked
by ORDER No. 18,750, dated September 19, 1942. Application for reinstatement was nmade
740 [Vol. 53: 733
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In arguing that withdrawal of Esquire's (or any other periodical's) second-
class privileges raises no question of interference with the freedom of the
press, both Postmaster General Walker and the District Court Judge have
glossed over the realities of newspaper and magazine distribution?' More
than 25,000 periodicals have established second-class entries; 32 in recent years,
more than 50% of the circulation of weekly, bi-weekly, and monthly popular
magazines has comprised subscription sales, primarily distributed through use
of the second-class rate.s The reliance on this method of circulation is
equally marked in the case of small-town and rural newspapers.34 Of course,
the government is not obligated to continue to maintain the subsidy to periodical
circulation, embodied in distribution at one sixth of cost by virtue of the
second-class rates. But it is equally plain that the administration of the privi-
lege must not be discriminatory as between different publications.35 Otherwise
on September 23, 1942. After extensive hearings, the entry was restored as of the date
of application, by letter dated August 24, 1943, sent from Ramsay Black, Third Assistant
Postmaster General, to the Publisher of the Police Gazelle. During the interim, the maga-
zine was mailed at second-class rates, but a fund was deposited with the Department by the
Publisher to defray the additional cost of mailing these issues at third-class rates, if the
decision went against the Police Gazcte. The diposit was returned after re-entry was
permitted. Information supplied to the Yale Law Journal by Clifford Forster, Esq., Coun-
sel for the Police Gazette, in letter dated October 21, 1944. Apparently no attempt was made
to assert that the masculine magazine in question did not meet the fourth condition of the
second-class mailing statute.
31. Compare the remarks of Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in the
Milwaukee Leader case, 255 U. S. 407 (1921) : "But while he (the Postmaster) may
thus exclude from the mail specific matter which he deems of the kind declared by Congress
to be unmailable, he may not, either as a preventive measure or as a punishment, order
that in the future mail tendered by a particular person or the future issues of a particular
paper shall be refused transmission." Id. at 421-22. "If such power were possessed by the
Postmaster General, he would, in view of the practical finality of his decisions, become
the universal censor of publications. For a denial of the use of the mail would be for
most of them tantamount to a denial of the right of circulation!' Id. at 423.
32. Respondent's Answer in the District Court, ff 22.
33. CoMPRIsoN OF MAGAZINE CIRCULATIONS FOR FIRST Sx O uns, 1942-3 (Popu-
lar Science Publishing Co., 1943). In 1943, total circulation for the group of magazines
included in the study was 65,596,394. Of this total, 34,222,345 represented subscriptions, in
almost all cases distributed through the mails. The comparable figures for 1942 were
63,428,602 total circulation, and 34,622,332 subscription sales. See also Kadin, AdnmFinisra-
five Censorship (1939) 19 B. U. L. REv. 533, 538, 541; Are'r GEN. Com. Arnz;. Pncc,
Moxo. No. 13, THE POST OrFicE DEPARTMENT (1940) 8.
34. CHA-F.E, FREEoM OF SPEECH (1920) 144. See brief filed in District Court on
behalf of the Pennsylvania Newspaper Publishers' Association.
35. Compare the remarks of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in the
Milwaukee Leader case, 255 U. S. 407 (1921) : "It is argued that although a newspaper
is barred from the second-class mail, liberty of circulation is not denied; because the first-
and third-class mail and also other means of transportation are left open to a publisher.
Constitutional rights should not be frittered away by arguments so technical and unsub-
stantial .... But to carry newspapers generally at a sixth of the cost of the service and
19441
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
not only will unfair conditions of competition be imposed on individual pub-
lishers, but the public will be restricted in its access to varied reading matter.
As Mr. Justice Brandeis said, in his dissenting opinion in the Milwaukee
Leader case, legal technicalities cannot obscure the fact that equitable adminis-
tration of the Classification Statute is necessary to subsidize the same right of
the people, as the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect from government
infringement-the right of a free press.30
Considered from this practical standpoint, the Esquire revocation order
would appear to be predicated upon an unconstitutional interpretation of the
Classification Statute, not intended by Congress, because it imposes previous
restraints on freedom of circulation and because it vests arbitrary powers of
selection in the Postmaster General.3 7
Previous Restraint. At least since Blackstone's day, it has been recognized
that elimination of previous restraints is the cornerstone of freedom of the
press.3 8 None of the present express exclusion statutes authorize anything
to deny that service to one paper of the same general character, because to the Postmaster
General views therein expressed in the past seem illegal, would prove an effective censor-
ship and abridge seriously freedom of expression . . . " Id. at 431. "The contention that,
be cause the rates are non-compensatory, use of the second-clas trail ig not a right but a
privilege which may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of Congress, rests upon an
entire misconception, when applied to individual members of a class. The fact that it is
largely gratuitous makes clearerits position as a right; for it is paid for by taxation." Id. at
433.
36. 255 U. S. 407, 429 (1921).
37. The constitutional problem involved is best appreciated by treating the administra-
tive interpretation of the statute, as if it were a restatement of the text thereof. In effect,
the statute has been made to read: "Periodicals which in the opinion of the Postmaster
General make a special contribution to the Public Welfare are entitled to be circulated
at specially low rates."
38. "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free press .. .; this
,consists in laying no previous restrainst upon publications." 4 COOLEY'S BLACKSTONF, 151.
However, after the introduction of the printing press in England, its exercise wag con-
trolled first by the King and then, during the resign of James I, by the Star Chamber.
Parliament succeeded to the role of censor of the Press in 1641. Vance, Freedom of
Speech and of the Press (1918) 2 MINN. L. Rv. 239, 242-3. No mention of freedom of
the press was made in the Petition of Right in 1628 or the Bill of Rights in 1689. In fact
the English were "not free to print without previous license until the beginning of the
eighteenth century..." Truth'was not a defense (in defamation actions) until the passage
of Fox's Libel Act in 1792. 32 Geo. III, c. 60. The maxim was "the greater the truth,
the greater the libel." Wettach, Restrictions on a Free Press (1926) 4 N. C. L. Ry.. 24, 26,
See also 2 MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1912) 4.
The English views as to the restricted nature of free discussion were brought across
the Atlantic by the early Colonial governments. In 1671, Governor Berkeley of Virginia
thanked God that "there are no free schools or printing; and I hope we shall not have
them these hundred years; for learning has brought disobedience and heresy and sects
into the world, and printing has divulged them. .. ." Wettach, supra, at 26. Cf. the Peter
Zenger case. 17 How., State Trials 675 (1735). By 1776, however, most state constitu-
tions contained recognition of the correlative rights of freedom of speech and of the press.
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more than the denial of the mails to the particular circulars, or numbers of
periodicals 39 containing proscribed matter. O In effect, this provides an in rein
penalty. The Esquire decision proceeds on a forfeiture theory, i.e., that past
infractions justify denial of the second-class rate to all future issues of an
offending periodical; as pointed out above, this means virtual banishment from
the subscription market and makes continued existence problematical. 4 '
Since, as Justice Holmes pointed out in his concurring dissent in the Mil-
waukee Leader case,42 the very purpose of the First Amendment was to pre-
vent previous restraints, grave doubts exist as to the correctness of the ma-
jority decision in that case. Although the dissenting justices did not raise
the point, the government's power over the mails would seem to be subject to
restriction by the "clear and present danger rule," 13 to the same extent as its
See Vance, supra: COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAr.L Lmtmroxs (1871) 518; but cf. Respublica
v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319 (Pa. 1788).
39. Except in the case of "dead mail," the espionage statute is virtually in-
applicable to letters. 40 STAr. 230 (1917), 18 U. S. C. §343 (1940). Although other
exclusion statutes do not contain such limitations, it is clear that under the Fourth Amend-
ment the content of sealed matter is not subject to regulation, save perhaps under special
emergency legislation. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877); see also WVees v.
United States, 232 U. S. 3,3 (1914) ; United States v. Jones, 230 Fed. 262 (N. D. X. Y.
1916) ; Cohn, The Censorship of Radical Materials by the Post Office (1932) 17 ST. Louis
L. REv. 95, 100-111.
40. 35 STAT. 1129 (1911), 36 STAT. 1339 (1911), 18 U. S. C. §334 (1940) (banning
dissemination of information with regard to contraceptive devices) ; 53 STAT. 1341 (1939),
18 U. S. C. § 338(c) (1940) (denying the mails to materials used in connection with
the procurement of foreign divorce decrees). When such banned matter is included in
periodicals, it has been held that refusal to distribute them through the mails, pursuant
to statute, was not censorship but valid exercise of proper governmental functions. See
Burleson v. United States, 274 Fed. 479 (App. D. C., 1921) writ of error dism., sub nom.
United States ex rel Workingmen's Co-operative Pub. Ass'n v. Work, 260 U. S. 757 (1923).
41. See note 35 supra. See also Cohn, The Censorship of Radical Materials by the
Post Office (1932) 17 ST. Louis L. REv. 95, 109, 117.
42. 255 U. S. 407, 437 (1921) : "Papers that violate the (Espionage) Act are declared
non-mailable and the use of the mails for the transmission of them is made criminal. But
the only power given to the Postmaster is to refrain from forwarding the papers vhen
received and to return them to the senders ... He could not issue a general order that a
certain newspaper should not be carried because he thought it likely or certain that it would
contain treasonable or obscene talk." See also dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S. 138, 140-1 (1922). But see Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and
of the Mails (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 703, 714-5.
43. Shortly after the last war, Mr. Justice Holmes enunciated the "clear and present
danger" test in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919). Mr. Justice Holmes
and Mr. Justice Brandeis continued to affirm this rule in dissenting and concurring opinions
after the majority of the court shifted to the "tendency" rule. See, e.g., Abrams v. United
States, 250 U. S. 616, at 627-8, 629-31 (1919) ; Gitlow v. New York, 263 U. S. 652, 673
(1925) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927). In recent decisions, the "clear
and present danger" test seems to have become accepted by the majority of the court,
especially in dealing with situations when the statute did not delineate the types of language
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control over speech. In any event, the Esqzire case presents a clearly dis-
tinguishable situation. In the first place, the inarticulate major premise of the
majority decision in the Milwaukee Leader case was the inherent power of the
government to prevent the growth of internal dissension in war-time, Palpably
any war-engendered enlargement of the government's censorial powers is irrele-
vant when the gravamen of the Post Office Department's case is immorality.
Secondly, Mr. Justice Clarke's argument e." necessitate regarding the im-
possibility of any but previous restraints in the case of a daily newspaper is also
unavailable. Esquire is a monthly magazine. The postal code 44 requires that
a copy of each issue of a periodical allegedly entitled to second-class rates be
deposited with the local postmaster at the place of publication before mailing
to determine whether it contains matter which must be sent at higher rates.
There is no reason why there cannot be a concurrent determination of the
obscenity or other illegality of matter included in each issue.
'
Arbitrariness. In his revocation opinion, the Postmaster General declared
that in order to retain the second-class mailing entry, a publication "is
bound to do something more than refrain from disseminating material which
which were criminal. Compare Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941) and Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937) with Abrams v. United States, supra, Gitlow v. New York,
supra, and Whitney v. California, supra. See also Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J, 798,
801-8; FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SuPREME COURT (1938) c. 2; Wechs-
ler, Symposium on Civil Liberties (1941) 9 AMER. L. SCHOOL REv. 881.
A recent case, arising before the declaration of war, indicates a possible undermining
of the "clear and present danger" standard. A group of Trotskyite trade union leaders
were convicted of sedition in Minneapolis. The gravamen of the two counts in the prosecu-
tion's case was (1) conspiracy to overthrow the government, as evidenced by formation
of a union defense guard three years before the indictment and the purchase of four rifles,
and (2) dissemination of anti-war propaganda and literature suggesting agitation lor
changed living conditions and allegedly advocating overthrow of the government, to small
groups of soldiers. The trial judge refused requests for jury charges based on the "clear
and present danger" rule, in reliance on the Gitlow case supra. The jury acquitted the
defendants on the count alleging a conspiracy to overthrow the government; they were
convicted for conspiring to undermine the morale of the armed forces and for advocating
overthrow' of the government under one of the provisions of the Alien Registration Act of
1940, 54 STAT. 894, 50 U. S. C. App. § 311 (1940). United States v. Dunne, unreported de-
cision, District Court for Minnesota, Dec. 8, 1941. The convictions were sustained on appeal,
Dunne v. United States, 138 F. (2nd) 137 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943). The Supreme Court denied
certiorari, 320 U. S. 790 (1944), and twice refused to grant petitions for rehearing,
320 U. S. 814 (1944), 320 U. S. 815 (1944). See Comment (1942) 51 YAME L. J. 798, 807-8.
(For information concerning this case, the Yale Law Journal is also indebted to Carl
Rachlin, Esq., of the New York Bar, and Stanley Halperin, Second-year class, Yale Law
School.)
44. 20 STAT. 359 (1879), 39 U. S. C. §225 (1940).
45. The change in post office department procedure suggested infra 750, 756, need not
materially alter the situation. The local postmasters, if in doubt as to the obscenity or
other illegality of matter in any particular issue, or as to whether the issue met the
conditions of the second-class statute, could forward it to the officials charged with re-
sponsibility for decision.
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is obscene or bordering on the obscene. It is under a positive duty to contribute
to the public good and the public welfare." 40 This language appears to con-
stitute a substantial and unjustifiable deviation from the terms of the statute 4T
and, as will be indicated infra, from the administrative interpretations thereof
during the past 65 years. Since there are no statutory standards of interpre-
tation, it would make the decision as to whether particular magazines or news-
papers were entitled to be distributed at the second-class rate dependent upon
the changing literary whims and political judgments of successive Postmasters
It is hard to believe that a statute which conferred so arbitrary a power of deci-
sion on an administrative official could stand the crucible of the Fifth Admend-
ment.48 At the very least such legislation would appear to deny due process
because of its vagueness.4 9
46. See POST OrmcE DEPARTmIENT OnRER No. 23,459 (1943) 10.
47. See text of statute quoted 12 supra, note 12.
48. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Mitaauh-ee Leader case,
255 U. S. 407, 431 (1921). Again, even if the privilege doctrine were to be perpetuated,
legislation to this effect would appear to run afoul of the Fifth Amendment since the power
it conferred to discriminate unreasonably between persons, e.g. magazine publishers, en-
gaged in the same line of business, is tantamount to deprivation of property, without due
process of law. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
49. See United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921) ; see also Hewitt
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 39 (1906). A second-class entry
would appear to be almost as vital to the continued competitive position of a periodical as
the license to practice medicine was to the physician in the Hewitt case, spra. See CHArm=,
F EDmm OF SPEnc (1920) 109 et. seq.
In his dissenting opinion in the Milwaukee Leader case, Mr. Justice Brandeis argued
that revocation of a second-ciass entry because of past transgressions constituted the levy-
ing of a continuing and increasing fine against the publisher, measured by the difference
'between the cost of distribution at the second-class and at the next cheapest rate. He
further asserted that Congress probably lacked power, because of the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments and Art. 3, Sec. 2, Cl. 3 of the Constitution, to vest authority in an executive
officer to inflict such "fines" on his own initiative. 255 U. S. 407, 433-5 (1921). This
contention cannot be answered by the mere fact that the Postmaster has been given no
formal power to inflict criminal penalties and does not couch his orders as if they were such
punishments. See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (U. S. 1867). However, recent
decisions expanding the permissible scope of power delegable to administrative officers to
include the authority to impose monetary penalties presumably outdate this portion of the
dissent. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v.
Elting, 287 U. S. 329 (1932) ; see also Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 547, 551
(U. S. 1871); GF.xouR, AnMismxsnAmvn LAw (1940) 4-7-51. A possible distinguishing
factor is the circumstance that there is no legislative limitation on the "fine" which could
be imposed by the Postmaster General. See Tite v. State Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404,
57 P. (2d) 734 (1936), criticized in GELLHORN, supra at 447-8. Compare Section 4(e) of
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 979 (1935), 27 U. S. C. § 204(e)
(1940), sustained in Arrow Distilleries, Inc. v. Alexander, 109 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 7th,
1940). See also State Tax Commission v. Stanley, 234 Ala. 66, 173 So. 609 (1937);
Livesay v. DeArmond, 131 Ore. 563, 2S4 Pac. 166 (1930) ; Brown, Administratfve Com ws-
sions and the Judicial Power (1935) 19 MINN. L. REv. 261, 282-6, 294.
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As a possible escape from these overriding Constitutional policies, the deci-
sions of the District Court and the Postmaster General have fastened upon the
traditional "privilege doctrine," as a justification for a broad delegation of
control over the mails. Unquestionably the older cases contain language which
intimates the existence of a plenary control in Congress." But these cases 51
did not involve the arbitrary type of administrative power sought to be exer-
,cised in the Esquire decision. More important, reaffirmation of the "privilege
doctrine" at this time would appear to be in anachronistic contrast to the tenor
of recent Supreme Court cases broadening the protection accorded under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to such fundamental civil liberties as the
rights of free speech,52 and freedom of assembly.63 In Near v. 11inesota 54
and Gros]ean v. Aierican Press Co.,5 both dealing with state power, the
Court appeared to accept the views of the dissenters in the Milwaukee Leader
case as to the analogous limitations on governmental power to impose previous
restraints on publication or circulation. Accordingly, it would appear desirable
to have the Appellate Court, sitting on the Esquire case, "sweep away the web
of unreality of the privilege doctrine" and ground control of the mails on the
police power, as restricted by the "clear and present danger" rule.60 A per-
suasive analogous renunciation of "administrative absolutism in the service of
intellectual mercantilism" 57 is presented in recent decisions in two other fields
in which the federal government had traditionally been held to enjoy "plenary
powers"-the exclusion of aliens 58 and the admission of imported literature.60
50. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877) and cases cited in supra, note 9.
51. See notes 9 and 18, supra.
52. See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941); A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S.
321 (1941); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242
(1937).
53. See Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 (1939); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353
(1937).
54. 283 U. S. 697 (1931) (Statute authorizing suppressing as nuisance periodicals
which published scandalous or defamatory attacks on public officials held unconstitutional.)
In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938) and Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147
(1939)-, similar freedom from previous restraints on the distribution of leaflets in city
streets was-held required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
55. 297 U. S. 233 (1936) (tax on newspaper circulation held unconstitutional).
56. FRAKFuRTER, op cit. supra note 43, at 57; see also Cushman, National Police
Power Uder the Postal Clause of the Constitution (1920) 4 MiNx. L. Ray. 402. In this
connection, recognition should be given to the cases holding that freedom of speech cannot
be circumscribed under the "clear and present danger" rule, unless the evil sought to be
averted is serious enough, or the possibility of subsequent redress by criminal or civil action
so futile as to overbalance the public interest in freedom of expression. See Near v. Mine-
sota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) ; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U. S. 624 (1943).
57. Brief on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union as anicus curiae, filed in
the District Court, in Esquire v. Frank Walker, 85 F. Supp. 1015 (D. D. C. 1944), p. 8.
58. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943) ; Kessler v. Strecker,
307 U. S. 22 (1939). Compare Perkins v. EI, 307 U. S. 325 (1939).
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Another reason for overthrowing the "privilege doctrine" is the fact that
the Federal Government possesses a statutory monopoly over the conduct of
a postal service.60 In consequence, it is hard to see why the Department should
not be obligated to furnish service without arbitrary discrimination between
applicants, 61 by analogy to the rule that public utilities, including those owned
by local and state governments, must accord equal treatment to all actual or
prospective customers.0 2
The Statutory Issue. The constitutional issues adumbrated in the preceeding
paragraphs probably will be phrased in the appellate proceedings primarily as
guides to the construction of the Classification Statute.0 The key exegetic dis-
pute hinges about the validity of the Postmaster's conclusion that to obtain
second-class rates a periodical is under "a positive duty to contribute to the
public good and welfare." 4 On the linguistic level, it does not readily appear
how the contribution criterion can be read into the minimal statutory standard
that a periodical must be "published for the dissemination of information of
a public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts, or some special
industry." 65 On the practical level, the Department's interpretation is vitiated
by its own concession that application of the suggested test would require ter-
mination of the second-class entries of "a large number of publications
59. See U. S. v. One Book called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 132 (S. D. N. Y. 1933),
affirmed 72 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1934); Parmelee v. United States, 113 F. (2nd)
729 (App. D. C., 1940).
60. 35 STAT. 1123-4 (1909), 18 U. S. C. 304-9 (1940).
61. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 507 (1904); Consumers Union v.
Walker (unreported decision, App. D. C., Sept. 25, 1944). Compare 'Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U. S. 80 (1941); dissenting opinion of justice Brandeis in the Miw'tz :cc
Leader case, 255 U. S. 407, 433 (1921); "A citizen of the United States as such has a
right.. . to have the benefit of the postal laws ;" CooLnv, PrINCIPLES op CouSTuTxo1Ar.
LAw (4th ed. 1931) 322.
62. Columbia Railway, Gas & Elec. Co. v. South Carolina, 27 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A.
4th, 1928); Board of Water Comm'rs of Hartford v. Bloomfield, 84 Conn. 52, 20 At.
794 (1911) ; Canavan v. Mfechanicsville, 229 N. Y. 473, 128 N. E. 8M2 (1920); see also 4
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2nd ed., 1928) § 1821. An analogous conclusion
is dictated by the cases dealing with revocation of licenses to conduct regulated businesses,
for extra-statutory reasons. See Stone v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 82 N. . 792 (1907) ; State
ex rel. Bunch v. Fortney, 93 W. Va. 292, 116 S. E., 753 (1923).
63. The importance of preserving freedom of the press is unquestionably a decisive
factor to be considered in interpreting the statute. See Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 49
(1939). It would seem appropriate to apply the rule of United States v. Delaware &
Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909) that: "... where a statute is susceptible of two con-
structions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." See also
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 492 (1904); United States v. Gettysburg Ele. Ry.,
160 U. S. 668, 630 (1896); 2 SUTHERI-ND, STATUTORY CoNsTRucrio. " (3rd Ed. 1943)
§ 4509. Compare United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 487 (U. S. 18).
64. POST OFFIcE DEPARTuENT ORDER No. 23,459 (1943), 10.
65. 20 STAT. 359 (1879) ; 39 U. S. C. 226 (1940).
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and periodicals of the editorial, fiction, and humorous classes, even though
educational, innocent, delightful, and entertaining... ." , On the legal level,
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Postmaster has sought to impose
additional conditions on the use of the second-class privilege not authorized
by Congress. An analogous attempt at administrative addition-by regula-
tion, however, rather than order-was overruled in Payne v. National Railway
Pub. Co., 67 holding invalid the construction that only publications containing
"current news or miscellaneous literary matter, or both" were entitled to be
classified as second-class mail.
It is also significant that the present attempt to read quality standards into
the statute runs counter to the interpretation of the statute by Postmaster Gen-
eral Walker's predecessors 6s in office from its enactment in 187§ to date.
Except for the interlude terminated by the Payne decision,69 the traditional
interpretation has been that every regularly issued, genuine periodical comes
within the compass of the second-class provisions. The necessity for expan-
sion of governmental authority to meet the changing conditions of societal
existence renders dangerous any general assertion of a rule of statutory con-
struction that past failure to assert power under a statute intimates that it was
never conferred.70 Nevertheless, the validity of the traditional interpretation
in the present situation is indicated by the repeated Congressional refusal-
in dealing with proposed amendments to statutes specifi'cally empowering the
Postmaster to ban certain types of matter from the mails-to grant authority
to4 exclude future issues of periodicals containing illegal matter.71
In an apparent attempt to circumvent, consideration of the statutory (as
well as the Constitutional and factual) issues, the respondent in the Esquire
appeal has devised a variation on the familiar rule of "administrative finality."
66. PosT OrFicE DrARMENT ORDER No. 23,459 (1943), 6.
67. 20 App. D. C. 581 (1902), cert. granted, 189 U. S. 512 (1903), cert. dism. on
motion of Postmaster General, 192 U. S. 602 (1904). (This case involved a bill by the
Railway Guide-a monthly periodical giving time tables for all first class passenger rail-
roads in the United States-for an injunction against an order revoking its second class
entry.)
68. Compare POST OFFicE DEPARTMENT ORDER No. 23,459 (1943), 9. See also REroar op
POSTAL CoMMISSION (1907) xxxvi; see sources cited note 71, in!ra.
69. See supra note 67.
70. Compare United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters' Asso., 64 Sup. Ct. 1162
(1944) and Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Rowan and Nichols, 310 U. S. 573 (1940) with
Federal Trade Comm. v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U. S. 349 (1941) and Norwegian Nitrogen
Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933). See also Note (1941) 50 Y=ta L. J,
1294; dissenting opinion of Black, J., in United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U. S.
600, 615-20 (1941).
71. See statement of Congressman Volstead (the floor manager) on the Espionage
Act of 1917, 55 Cong. Rec. 1607 (1917) and CONF. REP., id. at 3129, 3307 (1917);
Hearings before Committee on Post Office and Post Roads (63rd Cong. 3d Sess.), on
Exclusion of Certain Publications from the Mails (1915), 38, 39.
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Although in his order of revocation,72 the Postmaster General adverted to the
possibility of judicial appeal, as one justification for the severity of his action,
his answer in the District Court asserted that "the exercise of his judgment and
discretion... is not subject to review or control by the Court." 7a By analogiz-
ing the case to that of an appeal from a Draft Board Classification, the Dis-
trict Court Judge appears to have accepted the administrative position. How-
ever, in so far as the interpretation of the statute is involved, the cases hold
that the Post Office Department is subject to the general rule that the courts
are not bound by the interpretation of statutes, made by the administrative offi-
iais charged with their enforcement.7
Nor does the Postmaster General's position that his "findings of fact" are
not subject to judicial scrutiny appear to be tenable.70 While the precise issue
does not seem to have been raised in previous classification cases, in the more
recent decisions dealing with fraud or other exclusion questions, there has
been a consistent tendency to invoke the familiar "substantial evidence" rule,
in lieu of earlier standards vesting the Department with greater discretion.7"
Mforeover, on close analysis, it becomes evident there are no real issues of fact
involved in the Esquire appeal. For the determination of whether a periodical
disseminates "information of a public character," publishes material pertain-
ing to "literature" or the "arts," or "contributes to the public welfare" is palp-
ably primarily a matter of statutory construction. 8 Even if the Chancery
72. PosT OrricE DEPARTmExNT OanD No. 23,459 (1943), 13. Later, the Postmaster post-
poned the effectiie date of revocation to afford an opportunity for Esquire "... to appeal
this order to a court of competent jurisdiction to fully review and settle this matter in
which the publication, the Post Office Department, and the general public have such a
direct and substantial interest." TRANscRipr, 5593.
73. Respondents' answer in the District Court, U 32: Compare the Annual Report of
the Postmaster General for the Fiscal Year ended January 30, 1943 (1943), 8, in which
it is stated, with reference to deprivations of the second-class privilege, that: "Cases decided
adversely by the Postmaster General are subject to a review by the courts:'
74. Esquire v. Frank Walker, 55 F. Supp. 1015 (D. D. C. 1944).
75. Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 412 (1921); American School
of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1902) ; Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152
Fed. 787 (C. C. E. D. Mo., 1907) ; Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, 181 Fed. 579 (C. C.
E. D. N. Y., 1910); see also F. C. C v' Columbia Broadcasting System, 311 U. S. 132
(1940).
76. Farley v. Heininger, 105 F. (2d) 79 (App. D. C., 1939); Natl. Conference on
Legalizing Lotteries v. Farley, 96 F. (2d) 861 (App. D. C., 1938); Farley v. Simmons,
99 F. (2d) 343 (App. D. C., 1938). These cases presumably should have been treated as
binding by a District Court Judge, sitting in the District of Columbia. See also Leach v.
Carlile, 258 U. S. 138 (1922) ; Hurley v. Dolan, 297 Fed. 825 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924) ; Moxie
Nerve Food Co. v. Holland, 141 Fed. 202 (C. C. R. I., 1905) ; Note (1941) 50 YxAu L. J.
1479.
77. See Wheeler v. Farley, 7 F. Supp. 433 (S. D. Cal. 1934); Putnam Y. Morgan,
172 Fed. 450 (C. C. S. D., N. Y. 1909); People's U. S. Bank v. Gilson, 140 Fed. 1 CC. C.
E. D., Mo. 1905)
78. See Jacksonville Paper Co. v. N. L. R. B., 137 F. (2d) 148, 150 (C. C. A. 5th,
1943).
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precedents were followed, the Postmaster's decision embodies only "ultimate
findings of fact"; as careful critics have demonstrated, such findings are, at
least in part, camouflaged "conclusions of law." 70
Two additional considerations serve to diminish the weight which should
be accorded to the Postmaster's constructions of the statute and determinations
of pseudo-factual questions. In the first place, the real basis for application
of the doctrine of administrative finality is of course the judicial recognition
of the expertise of regulatory bodies in dealing with technical problems.80
While the Postmaster may well have special competence in determining such
questions as whether a periodical is "regularly published," it is hard to see
why his opinions on the merits or quasi-obscenity of literature or art should
be entitled to fibality.81 In the second place, recent Supreme Court decisions,
although not squarely stating a differential standard, indicate that closer
scrutiny should be given to determinations on factual questions when funda-
mental individual civil liberties are at stake, than in cases involving mere regula-
tion of business practices.8 2 This practice, developed in the past decade in
reviewing the administration of justice in state courts, is equally applicable
in considering appeals from orders of federal or state administrative agencies.83
III.
It is to be hoped that the Esquire case focuses attention upon the desirability
of altering certain of the procedures now utilized by the Post Office Department.
Although the statute requires that a hearing be held prior to revocation of a
second-class entry,84 the practice has developed of conducting hearings only on
79. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 155-9; HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CON-
cEP'iONS (1919), 32-3; Cohen, Law and Scientific Method (1928) 6 AMER. LAW ScHOoL
Rzv. 231, 235-6; compare, CUNNINGHAM, TExTmooR: OF LOGIc (1924) 337ff.
80. See GELLEORN, ADMINIsTRA~rlv LAW (1940) 11-19; Laski,The Limitations of the
Expert (1930) 162 HARPER's 101; FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITE
ON ADkINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941) 15-17; Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Com'n:
An Appraisal (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 915, 949; Remarks of Chief Justice Taft, reprinted in 257
U. S., xxv-xxvi (1921).
81. See United States v. One Book entitled "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S. D. N. Y. 1933),
aff'd 72 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1934). 6
82. Compare Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80 (1941) with U. S. v. Trucking
Company, 310 U. S. 344 (1940)-both involving appeals from orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. See also Virginia Electric Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., 319 U. S.
533 (1943) ; U. S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938) ; Lusky, Minority
Rights and the Public Interest (1942) 52 YALE L. J. 1.
83. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944) ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649
(1944) ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227
(1940) ; Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor, 312 U. S. 287, 294 (1941). See also White v.
Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940) ; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 353 (1939); JAcI:soN, THiE
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941) 284-5. Compare the earlier analogous
language in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373 (1886).
84. 31 STAT. 1107 (1901); 39 U. S. C. §232 (1940).
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demand by the publisher of the cited periodical. In other situations, the issu-
ance of a Departmental order is preceded only by informal consultations with
the publisher and his representatives or by an exchange of correspondence,
perhaps including briefs on any disputed legal issues. s In the citation letter,
the publisher is not even informed of his right to a hearing.8s
Within the Department, the responsibility for determining whether given
periodicals are to be deprived of their second-class entries (or granted them
on initial or re-application) has been confided to the Third Assistant Postmaster
General.87 In the making of factual investigations, reliance is apparently
usually placed upon the local postmasters; 8 when a question of obscenity is
involved, however, the opinion of the Department Solicitor is usually treated
as final.8 9
As the Monograph on the Post Office Department of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure indicated four years ago, this proced-
ure is unobjectionable, in the bulk of the revocation citations, dealing with such
questions as whether or not a periodical has satisfied the physical criteria for
second-class matter?0O Here the decision is made on the basis of a small group of
physical exhibits-i.e., the periodicals themselves-,and the opportunity to
present written statements would appear to be adequate protection for the
publisher. When the issue is that of the existence of a regular group of sub-
scribers-one presented in dealing with magazines stigmatized by the officials
as advertising throwaways-the decision hinges upon whether or not those
subscribers are receiving a gratuity. The present practice of having the local
Postmasters, often the persons who initiate the inquiry, make the investiga-
tion on which the decision is based seems obviously unfair. It would seem
85. A7T'Y GFNx.s Comn . ON ADm. Proc., THE Post OrFxcE DEAwrm.-r, Monograph
No. 13, (1940) 17-22. (Cited hereinafter as "Post O inc DEP'T MONOGMrPH"). See
also Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152 Fed. 787, 793 (E. D. Mo., 1907); (1944) 54 C-m
Lm. QuAm. 1.
In a recent decision arising under the obscenity statute, 18 U. S. C. §334 (1940), a
District Court Judge sitting in the District of Columbia held that the issuance of an order
banning from the mails as obscene the pamphlet, Preparing for Marriage, written by Dr.
Paul Popenoe of the University of Southern California, Director of the Institute of Family
Relations, violated due process because there had been a "denial of a hearing and an oppor-
tunity to produce witnesses and present evidence.. ." Unreported Decision, District Court
for the District of Columbia, July 26, 1944. Accordingly, an injunction was issued on
motion for summary judgment, under Federal Rule 56, 28 U. S. C., following § 723(c)
(1940). This case is now on appeal. The factual background of the case is outlined in
AmEicANr Cwmz Lumnrms UNIoN, W ,%r's OB sCEE (1940) 5-6.
86. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GEEu.F.-AS COiMUIITEE ON ADnz.I nsT =iA
PROcEDuRE (1941) 151. (Cited hereinafter as "FiNAL RE-oRT:")
87. POSTAl LAws AND REGuLATIOS (1940) §§ 531-3, 588. See POST Omcr.n DrCT
MONOGRAPH 7-20.
88. POST OFFicE DEP'T MONOGR l'H 17.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id. at 24-25.
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preferable to separate the preliminary inquiry and determination phases of the
administrative process by providing for an investigation of the facts, after
the issuance of a citation, by another division of the Department."' Presuni-
ably the policy followed in the investigation of fraud charges could be emulated
-and the function of the existing Postal Inspectors broadened to cover this
category of revocation cases.
A different type of problem is presented when the gravamen of the revoca-
tion or exclusion proceeding is the alleged obscenity, seditious effect, or-as in
the Esquire case-non-contribution to the public interest, of a periodical. Cer-
tain preliminary objections to the present Departmental practices are obvious.
The occasional failure in obscenity cases to give the publisher notice prior to
exclusion from the mails can hardly be justified, even under the "privilege"
doctrine.92 Equally unjustifiable is the failure to furnish an articulated, written
statement of the reasons for exclusion 9 3 -an omission which does the Depart-
ment a disservice by acting as an invitation to de novo judicial review 04 but
which serves equally as an invitation to administrative despotism. 5
More difficult is the question of the type of hearing procedure which should
be utilized in determining questions of obscenity or seditious effect. Despite
the failure to find a violation-perhaps based on the belief the evidence could
not sustain an indictment 9 -- of the obscenity statute; it is patent that the
Esquire case belongs in this category.9 7 While occasional court cases provide
verbal guidance in the definition of obscenity for purposes of the postal and
similar statutes,98 the application of these necessarily vague definitions to spe-
91. See Id. at 25-9; FINAL REPORT, 156.
92. See NATL CouNciL ON FREEOM FRoMt CENsoismp, THE POST OFFICE CmsoR
(1931) 7.
93. See Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53 (1912) ; letter to Yale Law Journal, October
26, 1944, from Clifford Forster, Esq., Counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union;
but see PosT OrncE DFP'T MONOGRAPH, 18.
94. See p. 745 supra.
95. See Kadin, Adminisfrative Censorship (1939) 19 B. U. LAW Ray. 533, 548,
96. As Fourth Assistant Postmaster General Walter Myers pointed out in a recent
memorandum to Postmaster General Walker, the specific exclusion statutes all first make
the transmittal of specified matter through the mails a crime, and then declare it non-
mailable. In other words, the evidence upon which matter is mailed must be such as would
sustain- a conviction, and must therefore establish non-mailability "beyond a reasonabld
doubt." SUPPLEmENTARY RECoMMENDATION IN THE EsQuiRE CASE, Nov. 22, 1943, re-
printed in Plaintiff's Brief in the District Court, Esquire v. Frank Walker [55 F. Supp.
1015 (D. D. C. 1944)], at 134, 140, 142.
97. POST OFFICE D'ARTMENr ORDER No. 23,459 (1943) 10-11.
98. The key postal cases are Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446 (1896);
United States v. Limehouse, 285 U. S. 424 (1932). More useful are recent decisions in
the inferior federal courts, which have departed from the old criterion of obscenity as any
"tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of those open to such influence." As Judge
Learned Hand has pointed out, this criterion presupposed that the possibility of giving
"some prurient person ... a sensual gratification" outweighed "all interests of art, letters,
or science." United States v. Levine, 83 F. (2d) 156, 157 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1936). See also
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cific situations is largely a matter of individual taste and conscience. The
basic objection to the procedure followed in the Esquire, Police Gazele, and
analogous cases is that the departmental hearing boards are now composed of
civil servants or political appointees who are often persons with dubious quali-
fications as experts in the appraisal of literature or the arts.03 The conduct of a
public hearing, wherein two sets of expert witnesses give conflicting testimony,
does not serve to alter the situation materially. In the first place, the non-parti-
sanship of the experts is usually suspect; it is hardly to be expected that the
department or the publishers will present any witnesses whose opinions have not
been determined in advance. 0 0 Secondly, the non-expert board or, as in tile
Esquire case, the non-expert Postmaster General is usually not in a position to
pass a qualified judgment on the conflicting testimony. In the Esquire case, for
example, the Postmaster General's opinion was contrary to the clear preponder-
ance of the expert testimony -particularly that of the literary critics.""'
The Postmaster General's decision also seems to have ignored the tenor of
recent cases, arising under other statutes dealing with obscenity, 0 2 in which
the criterion of exclusion or punishment has been defined as violation of con-
temporary literary or artistic taste and mores, and in which it has been held
that the whole publication, and not merely excerpts therefrom, must be con-
sidered .10 3 While few would deny that Esquire published some salacious ma-
United States v. Parmelee, 113 F. (2d) 729, 731-2 (App. D. C, 1940) ; United States v.
Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (1913). The criterion suggested by Judge Hand in the Ken-
nerly and Levine cases, mstpra, and followed by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in the Parmelee case, supra, was whether or iiot the allegedly obscene matter,
taken as a whole, offended the mores of the time. The earlier rule was initially formulated
by the English Court of Queen's Bench in Regina v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360 (1S63);
see also United States v. Bennett, Fed. Cas. No. 14,571, 16 Blatchf. 338 (1879).
99. The Hearing Board in the Esquire case consisted of Fourth Assistant Postmaster
General Walter Myers, Chief Clerk Frank Ellis, and Deputy First Assistant Postmaster
General Tom Cargill. See also FINAL REPORT, 156; Letter to Yale Law Journal, cited supra
note 93. It should be noted that Myers formerly was a member of the Bill of Rights Com-
mittee of the Indiana Bar Association.
100. See Matter of Bronx% Parkway Comm., 192 App. Div. 412, 182 N. Y. Supp. 916
(1920), affirmed per curiam, 230 N. Y. 607, 130 N. E. 912 (1921) ; Harno, Uniform Expert
Testimony Act (1938) 21 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 156; 2xn AxN,. REP. N. Y. LAW RM'. Couu',1.
(1936) 795 et seq.
101. See notes 24 supra and 104 infra; see also SUPPLPMENT.my REcoi_ ,l .'TIOn,
supra note 96, at 138, 142.
102. See cases cited supra note 98. See also United States v. One Book entitled 'lysses,"
72 F. (3d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (question of whether Joyce's book was obscene and
therefore not admissible into the United States, under § 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46
STAT. 590 (1930)] People v. Larsen, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 55 (Sup. Ct., 1933) (prosecution of
the publisher of Life Magazine for distributing obscene matter, under § 1141 of the New
York Penal Law). On November 1, 1944, the New York Special Sessions held that the
publishers of D. H. Lawrence's The First Lady Chatterly had not violated the state
obscenity statute, N. Y. Daily News, Nov. 2, 1944, p. 136.
103. United States v. One Book entitled "Ulysses," 72, F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
See also H. Doc. No. 603, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., xxxviii-xxxzx (1907).
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terial, it is equally clear that its contents include a considerable amount of
noteworthy fiction and art-work, as well as worthwhile discussion of public
issues.104 Recent polls indicate that the well-known Varga drawings '° -- one
of the chief targets of the Department's attack-are regarded as unobjectionable
by three-quarters of the public.100
The first important task is to modify the statutes and procedures, currently
followed by the Post Office, Department, in dealing with second-class revocation
cases, predicated upon alleged obscenity, quasi-obscenity, or sedition, and with
the analogous exclusion cases. Bills introduced at recent Congressional ses-
sions 107 proposed that when the postmaster at the place of mailing 108 believes
104. In the department hearing, H. L. Mencken testified that "practically all the prin-
cipal American authors have written for it (Esquire) in my time, headed by Dreiser, and
including every author of any significance whatsoever." TRANScR PT, 3453-4. (It should
be noted that Thomas V. Moore, one of the "experts", appearing for the Department,
had never heard of Dreiser. TRANscIPr, 5176-9. Reeves Lowenthal, President of the
Associated American Artists, stated that in every one of the eleven issues of Esquire, in
which material had been stigmatized as "obscene" or having an immoral effect, there
had been a "substantial art content of high value." TRACSCasrT 3409. See also testimony
of Dr. Fred S. Siebert, Director of the University of Illinois School of Journalism, re-
garding material printed in the magazine on affairs of public interest, TRANsCnnFr 3571-80;
Raymond Gram Swing, TRANScRIPT 2643-6; George Jean Nathan, TRAxscMrT 3041;
Bennett Cerb, President of the well-known publishing firms of Random House and the
Modem Library, TRAxscinr' 3044-5; Rev. Fred E. Luehs, of Ohio University, TRAX-
scRI 4149-56.
105. See Dissenting Memorandum of Tom. C. Cargill (Nov. 11, 1943). He was the sole
member of the Hearing Board, who thought Esquire's entry should not be revoked.
106. Polls as to the popular reaction to the Varga drawings were taken at the request
of the publisher of Esquire by the Curtis Publishing Co. and Crossley, Inc., of Princeton,
N. J. In the former poll, 80% reported that the drawings were not obscene; the com-
parable figure in the Crossley poll was 77%l. Both polls used the technique followed by
the American Institute of Public Opinion (the so-called "Gallup poll"). MEMORANDUM
oF THE HEAiNG BOARD (Nov. 11, 1943) 3-4. The Board majority commented "it is not
believed that the (Varga) pictures are obscene." Id. at Appendix A, p. 1.
On the other hand, Arnold Gingrich, the Editor of Esquire, admitted in his testimony
before the Board, that "our humor aud articles and our fiction all stressed a man alone
angle-you might call it a stag party type of treatment." (Transcript, 1627.) He further
admitted that the magazine regularly ran some "cartoons that de feature sex" (Id. at 1798)
and that the pictures in general were "frankly published for the entertainment they
afford." Id. at 8.
107. S. R. 1105, 78th Congress, 1st Sess. (1943) ; H. R. 4894, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess.
(1944). The House bill is still in Committee and has been referred for an opinion to the
Post Office Department. These almost identical bills are phrased as amendments to 18 U. S.
C. §211 (1940). Sub-section (a) thereof codifies the existing exclusion statutes. Sub-
section (b) provides for the procedure summarized it? the text. Sub-section (c) provides
for retention by the Postmaster of a copy of the seized matter in a "public file" and
transmittal of another copy to the Library of Congress. After termination of any judicial
proceeding involving seized matters, copies of the record thereof are to be filed in the
same depositaries. The purpose here is to preserve for posterity "what might be considered'
great literature to future generations." MEMORANDUM TO CONGRESSMAx RoWs- (sponsor of
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matter deposited for mailing violates any of the express exclusion statutes, he
shall intercept the matter and notify the publisher and the local United States
Attorney. Thereafter, the United States Attorney is directed to institute a
proceeding for the forfeiture and destruction of the seized matter in the
District Court. Upon demand by either party, a jury trial is to be granted.
The entire procedure is modeled on the provisions of the Customs Act of
1930, dealing with the importation of allegedly salacious material. 109
The requirement that notice of proposed exclusion be given forthwith to
publishers and the shift from in personam to in rem procedure,110 suggested
in the proposed bills, would constitute desirable modifications of the existing
procedures. The particular value of the in rcm procedure would be in render-
ing a decision in one district that a given periodical issue or book was not
obscene or seditious res iwdicata in subsequent actions in other districts.'
The proposal that the fact issues be tried de novo before a court and possibly
a jury-while seemingly contrary to the general recent trend in favor of admin-
istrative finality-also seems meritorious. Since the ultimate test of obscenity
is public opinion, the policy reasons for a jury decision are as compelling in
an obscenity case as in the determination of a defamation action.
However, it would be desirable to accompany enactment of the proposed
bills with change of the personnel of the departmental hearing boards. Here
again valuable precedent is afforded by the procedure of the Customs Bureau
of the Treasury Department in handling importation cases. After severe
criticism in the early 1930's,112 the internal procedure of the Treasury De-
partment was modified to provide that books, works of art, or motion pictures-
seized by port of entry examiners for alleged obscenity-would be transmitted
to the Assistant General Counsel of the department in charge of customs mat-
ters.113 An attorney with recognized critical faculties was selected for this
position."14 While the actual decision on admissibility is signed by the Deputy
H. R. 4894) FROM THE AmEuCAN Civi LIBERTIES UNION (1944), 4. Sub-section
(d) makes the deposit in the mails of matter adjudicated to be non-mailable within five
years a crime. [The purpose of the time limitation is to compel re-hearing on obscenity
or similar questions, in light of changing mores. MEmoR.\NDUZ supra, at 4.)]
108. The purpose of restricting the power to intercept to local postmasters is to avoid
a multiplicity of seizures. o pMORANDum spra note 107, at 3.
Liberties Union (May 26, 1944), 3.
109. 19 U. S. C. § 1305 (1940).
110. As pointed out in the text, supra p. 743, the exclusion statutes already provide an
h; rem civil penalty, in addition to the complementary criminal liabilities.
111. See U. S. v. One Obscene Book, 48 F. (2d) 821 (S. D. N. Y. 1931) (case arising
under Sec. 305 of the Customs Act, 19 U. S. C. 1305 (1940).
112. 2 Air'y GEN!.'S CoMm. ox ADMN. PRoc., ADMINISTRATION OF MTE CUsTons LAWS,
Monograph No. 27 (1940) 118.
113. Id., at 118-22.
114. Huntington Cairns was the first Assistant General Counsel of the Treasury Depart-
ment charged with this responsibility.
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Commissioner of Customs, the Assistant General Counsel's opinion is cus-
tomarily treated as conclusive within the Department.115 In appropriate cases,
the Assistant General Counsel consults with psychiatrists, museum curators, or
other technical experts.116 Since obscenity issues are now channelized through
the Department Solicitor's office, 11 there would appear to be no reason why
the Post Office could not attain similarly beneficial results by adopting the
practice of appointing competent connoisseurs to occupy the censor's position.
Two possibilities are apparent in considering modification of the revocation
procedure, for handling the issues in the Esquire, Milwaukee Leader, or similar
cases. By analogy to the customs and suggested exclusion procedures, a right
to de novo trial could be provided. Alternately, or concomitantly, the hearing
statute 118 could be modified so as to require the President to appoint a panel of
literary and art experts from which the personnel of each Board could be select-
ed. If this suggestion were adopted, the decision of the Board should presum-
ably be made final,' 19 except that the Postmaster General, like the publishers,
should be permitted to appeal to the courts on any issues of law or to determine
whether the fact findings complied with the substantial evidence rule.120 As
there is no reason to assume that the liberality displayed by a few lower
federal judges in recent years in dealing with obscenity cases 121 is representa-
tive of the generality of judicial opinion, the suggestion for change in the com-
position of the hearing boards is probably preferable. In any event, a country
dedicated to the preservation of freedom of discussion and free competition
in ideas 122 can hardly tolerate continued exercise of even restricted powers
of censorship by any group imbued with restricted and outmoded tastes.128
115. 2 Azri'y GEN.'s Comm. oF ADMIN. PRoc., ADMINISTRATION OF T9r CusToms LAWS,
Monograph No. 27 (1940) 121.
116. Id., at 119-20.
117. PosT OrricE DEP'T MONOGRAPH 18.
118. See note 84 supra.
119. This might also require modification of 17 STAT. 285 (1872), 5 U. S. C. § 369
(1940), requiring the Postmaster General to "superintend the business of the depart-
ment and execute all laws relative to the postal service."
120. If this suggestion were a4opted, the position of the Hearing Board vis-a-vns the
Postmaster and the courts would be analogous to the position of the Tax Court of the
United States, with relation to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on the one hand, and
appellate courts, on the other.
121. See cases cited supra in second portion of note 98 and in note 102. It should be
noted that these cases were decided for the most part in the Supreme Court of New York,
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (and especially the District Court for
the Southern District of New York), and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The judge who sat in the Esquire case had been assigned to temporary duty in the District
Court for the District of Columbia.
122. " .... the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market ... "' Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U. S. 616, 629 (1919).
. 123. See Consumers' Union v. Frank Walker (unreported decision, App. D. C., Sep-
tember 25, 1944).
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But no sort of procedural reform can have any durable value, unless the
Department heeds the sagacious advice of the Hughes Commission: 12,
"... . the experience of the Post Office has shown the impossibility
of maling a satisfactory (classification) test based upon literary or
educational values. To attempt to do so would be to set up a censor-
ship of the press."
124. See SuP.L~,rARY R.COmmExm.i ,O1N sura, note 96, at 141. The Commission
was composed of Charles Evans Hughes, President Lowell of Harvard University, and
Harry H. Wheeler of the Chamber of Commerce of Chicago.
